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Abstract: Machiavelli leaves one with both an optimistic and a pessimistic prognostication for the post-Cold War 
world. On the one hand, the end of that conflict has opened the way for the spread of liberal, constitutional 
regimes, which he would say are inclined to be more and more meticulous in honoring their commitments. On the 
other, the temptation to use force to create new facts and thereby force international law into new paths will remain 
as long as politics is practiced. The contemporary relevance of Machiavelli may be seen in that he urged both 
realities upon us.  I focus on a single incident that postdated the end of the Cold War—the show of force by the 
People's Republic of China (PRC) in the Taiwan Strait in March 1996. 
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[pg82]* There are two kinds of combat: one with laws, the other with force. The first is proper 
to man, the second to beasts; but because the first is often not enough, one must have recourse to 
the second. 
 MACHIAVELLI,  The Prince,  XVIII  
 
 The purpose of this essay is to view international law in light of Machiavelli's teachings 
on politics. I focus on a single incident that postdated the end of the Cold War—the show of 
force by the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the Taiwan Strait in March 1996. The 
disadvantage of writing about events that have relatively recently transpired is that some 
relevant information is unavailable because it has not been made public. However, there is also 
an advantage:  there is less danger of rationalization. For example, if ten years from now a 
scholar looking at state archive materials on the Taiwan Strait incident of1996 finds numerous 
memos on the international law aspects of the problem, the scholar may be led to believe that 
concerns about international law played a large role. Yet the paper trail may unduly magnify 
itself in historical contemplation; unrecorded conversations in soundproof rooms may have 
played a larger role in policy decisions. Machiavelli himself did not hesitate to use recent 
events interchangeably with historical materials to provide illustrations for his ideas.  
 
 Although he rarely discussed international law,FN1 Machiavelli's work illuminates the 
present-day study of international law because of what he had to say about power. One aspect 
of the complex relation between law and powerFN2 is that law can be an extension and 
implementation of a ruler's power. An autocratic prince will find that imposing law and order 
on his subjects simply increases his own wealth and freedom of action and hence is a useful 
tool in his arsenal of power. The law that he imposes upon his subjects does not  apply to 
himself; he is free to disregard it. Similarly, [pg83] those who are skeptical about international 
law often say that powerful nations use international law to impose their will upon smaller 
nations, while disregarding that same law when it in their national interest to do so. The 
problem with this aspect of the relation between law and power is that it is simple and trivial 
and only applies, if at all, in extreme cases, when all the chips are down. Machiavelli, the 
realist, knew that, when the chips were down, an autocratic prince would use his power to 
trump whatever legal rules were in place. And indeed, bullets will always win over words; it is 
futile to expect law to restrain activities when all the chips are down. To kill someone in self-
defense who is about to murder you is regarded in all countries as an exception to the law 
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against murder, not because the law says so (many early statutes making murder a criminal act 
did not mention self-defense) but because it would be futile for the law to attempt to restrain a 
person who must kill in order to avoid being killed. Machiavelli acknowledged that in a serious 
emergency it may be necessary to break the law. But breaking the law carries a price: "it 
establishes a custom of breaking laws for good purposes; later, with this example, they are 
broken for bad purposes."FN3 
 
 Although extreme cases are important, most of the time the cases are ordinary. 
Moreover, the more law there is, the fewer will be the occasions where cases are regarded as 
extreme. The more rules there are (or seem to be) in international relations, (1) the more states 
will interpret their own interests in light of those rules and (2) the more states will regard those 
rules as dispute-settlement mechanisms. As an example of (1), suppose that the international 
rule of freedom of the seas did not exist. Coastal states would then regard it as essential to their 
national interest to grab as much of the high seas as possible and militarily enforce it against 
predators from all the other nations. Instead, the rule of freedom of the seas simply removes 
from the active consciousness of government officials any desire to use power to engage in 
obtaining and securing sovereignty over the high seas. The rule simply removes an array of 
potential crises from consideration. As an example of (2), legal rules perform a natural function 
of being invoked by disputing parties in an effort to get their own positions accepted by the 
other side. If there is a set of relevant rules of international law out there to be invoked, 
governments will nearly always find it cheaper to invoke those rules in support of their own 
positions than to use military force; lawyers are cheaper than armies. Once lawyers from both 
sides get together to haggle over rules, crises tend to get defused, and a certain amount of give-
and-take and minor accommodations begins to look [pg84] desirable to both sides. I am not 
talking here about international courts as dispute-resolving mechanisms, even though such 
courts naturally reinforce the perception that disputes can be resolved peacefully. International 
law works in the absence of courts in the hundreds of minor international disagreements that are 
the daily stuff of foreign offices and embassies, with which Machiavelli, having himself served 
as an envoy, was certainly familiar. And even in major disputes, the availability of an 
apparently neutral set of rules is an almost irresistible invitation to try to accomplish one's goals 
by invoking and citing those rules. 
 
 Both (1) and (2) work together to produce a kind of increasing momentum. The more 
international law is given credit for defusing tensions or serving as a reference point for the 
resolution of conflicts, the better it will accomplish both of these tasks in the future. Perhaps a 
better way to make this point is that law works as a long-term phenomenon. This is due to two 
main factors. First, law operates reciprocally: although state S may lose today to state T because 
of rule X, S may win tomorrow against state U citing the same rule, and a year from now its 
position might change so that rule X now operates in S's favor against state T. Second, the 
entire system of law may be perceived to work in a powerful state's favor over time, despite the 
fact that not all of its rules are welcome. For example, the United States has changed its 
position on the Law of the Sea Treaty. During the Reagan administration, the United States 
refused to sign the treaty because of just a few provisions in the treaty—those that relate to 
ocean floor mining. The Clinton administration, while still viewing those rules as distasteful, 
simply concluded that you can't win them all and that most of the provisions in the Law of the 
Sea Treaty were sufficiently valuable to the United States as to outweigh the costs associated 
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with accepting the rules on deep sea mining. A contributing factor was the later assessment that 
the Reagan administration's evaluation of the potential profits of deep sea mining was overly 
optimistic. What is true of treaties is even truer of customary international law as a whole. If a 
powerful country flouts the system and acquires an outlaw status in the eyes of other countries, 
it risks losing more than it gains, especially since some of the risks are indeterminate (because 
customary law is itself to some extent indeterminate and continuously in the process of 
revision). Hence, over the longer term, the more powerful states begin to perceive that 
international law as a whole works in their self-interest. If international law did not exist today,  
I would be foolhardy in predicting that it would begin to arise tomorrow. But because it exists 
today, has existed for many centuries, and is becoming increasingly dense [pg85] and fine-
meshed, there is not much risk in predicting that it will be more effective and important 
tomorrow than it is today. 
 
 Even in Machiavelli's world where princes deposed other princes and mercenary armies 
conquered city-states and even turned against the princes who hired them,FN4 he advised 
founding princes to continue many of the old laws that people were accustomed to.FN5 
Moreover, Machiavelli never said that princes were above the law; rather, they had the power to 
violate the law, but they often had to pay a price for doing so.  He gave the example of 
Savonarola, who got a law passed and then did not observe it; his conduct "took influence away 
from him and brought him much censure," and added, “I do not think there is a thing that sets a 
worse example in a republic than to make a law and not keep it, and so much the more when it 
is not kept by him who has made it."FN6  International law is made by the statesFN7 and 
hence, to the extent that a powerful state has made a lot of it, that same state is perhaps all the 
more restrained from breaking the law for the reason that Machiavelli gave in his example of 
Savonarola.  
 
 The idea that law works best in the long run can be found in Machiavelli's observation 
about governments: "Governments by princes have lasted long, republican governments have 
lasted long, and both of them have needed to be regulated by the laws."FN8 This situation can 
obtain only when the prince himself obeys the laws: "when the people see that under no 
circumstances will he [the prince] break those laws, in a short time they feel secure and 
contented. An example is the kingdom of France, which lives safely for no other reason than 
that those kings are restrained by countless laws in which is included the security of all her 
people."FN9 
 
 Once a prince comes to realize that social control is a function of obeying the law, his 
mind may begin to rule out any base desires to break the law. He realizes, as Machiavelli 
implied, that the more he obeys the law the greater his personal power  becomes.  An orderly 
society that obeys the law is the ultimate portrait of the prince's personal power. Yet there 
seems to be a blind spot in Machiavelli's discussion of the Roman emperors: FN10 he does not 
perceive that some of them may have gotten high by arbitrarily violating the law. An emperor 
may lead the public to expect regularity through law, and then suddenly break the law himself 
in a situation that has absolutely no social utility—in fact, its consequences are deliberately 
harmful, and the shock and disbelief experienced by the public at the emperor's act is precisely 
what gives him his euphoric feeling of total power. It is possible that Saddam Hussein's 
decision to invade Kuwait in 1990 was this kind of deliberately shocking act driven by power-
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lust, for it is hard otherwise [pg86] to account for the folly of his decision. However, as we 
move away from princes and move toward republics—as nations are increasingly run by 
parliaments, groups, and committees—the chance of arbitrary breaches of international law 
may diminish. Individual power-lust can be filtered out in tedious committee meetings. In 
international law we are seeing occasional moves and feints toward war as if to remind one's 
antagonists that resorting to international force is not an entirely forgotten idea. Indeed, 
tweaking the rules of international law can sometimes be an advantage in international power 
confrontations, as we will see in considering the events of March 1996 off the China coast.  
 
 The United States in 1996 was the number one military power in the world; by most 
estimations, China was number two. Although Taiwan had considerable defense capability, it 
was not a formidable military power. Yet Taiwan was a strong economic trading partner with 
the United States (and with the People's Republic of China [PRC]), and had a democratic 
government that the United States had an interest in preserving. Although the States in 1979 
had terminated its Mutual Defense TreatyFN11 with Taiwan and had gradually withdrawn its 
soldiers who were stationed on that island, it continued its policy of arms transfers to Taiwan.  
Perhaps U.S. military strategists perceived that arming Taiwanese was more effective in 
discouraging aggressive impulses by the PRC than leaving U.S. troops on the island as a trip-
wire. After all, a future U.S. administration might withdraw the troops; perhaps, even in the 
course of a Chinese invasion, the American public would not tolerate the loss of American 
soldiers defending the Taiwanese, and would want them brought home. Moreover, military self-
defense has a huge battlefield advantage. If the PRC were to send fleets of soldiers across the 
Taiwan Strait, under standard military theory it would need at least twenty attacking personnel 
for every Taiwanese defender.  In addition, the preparations for any such attack from the 
mainland would be visible months in advance, giving the United States and other countries 
ample opportunity to come to the rescue of Taiwan. The 1992 sale to Taiwan of 150 F-16 
advanced jet fighters was dramatic corroboration of this aspect of U.S. policy. The PRC 
repeatedly and bitterly denounced U.S. arms transfers to Taiwan, but could do nothing about 
them.  
 
 By February 13, 1996, there were some Chinese military maneuvers from inland toward 
the Chinese coast opposite Taiwan. At a White House press briefing, the following exchange 
took place: [pg87]  
 
Q:  Has China been given an ambiguous answer on what we would do if it did attack Taiwan?  
 
PRESS SECRETARY MIKE MCCURRY:  Oh, I doubt very much, given the PRC's 
understanding of the Taiwan Relations Act, FN12 that they have much doubt. 
 
Q:  I thought you said earlier that we were being deliberately ambiguous.  
 
MR. MCCURRY:  Well, we've not—we've never specified the exact response consistent with 
the exact wording of the Taiwan Relations Act. But if you look at that act, if you look at the 
requirement for peaceful resolution of issues related to the Straits, it's quite clear what the view 




Q:  What would that be? 
  
MR.  MCCURRY:  It's very clearly specified in the Taiwan Relations Act. 
  
Q: Which is? 
  
MR.  MCCURRY:  Which I don't have in front of me.FN13  
 
One may note a theoretical equivalence between a government spokesperson's statements "our 
policy is ambiguous" and "our policy is clear but I don't know what it is." The important point 
is that the United States was not willing to reveal any of its military contingency plans in 
advance of China's intentions becoming clearer; the rest is the usual diplomatic double-talk.  
 
 A month later, the U.S. government, through its spokesperson, opted in favor of directly 
labeling its policy as ambiguous:  
 
Q:  Do you think the United States would be bound by the 1979 Act to defend Taiwan against 
Chinese aggression?  
 
MR. MCCURRY:  The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act does not answer that question specifically 
and, indeed, there is merit we believe in keeping somewhat ambiguous about the matter.FN14 
 
Various motives have been ascribed to the PRC for amassing its military forces in the Taiwan 
Straits. The American media reported that China was trying to influence the upcoming 
Taiwanese presidential elections on March 25, and that China was concerned about the example 
on the Chinese people of Taiwan's open and democratic elections. Neither of these alleged 
motives is particularly credible. It seems instead that China was making a statement during the 
Taiwan election campaign that no matter who was elected, the government should cease its 
foreign activities seeking [pg88] to obtain an international personality for Taiwan. I cite as 
evidence for this proposition a report by CNN on March 12 that the PRC offered to withdraw 
its military forces from the Taiwan Strait if Taiwan withdrew its overseas campaign for entry 
into the United Nations—an offer that Taiwan promptly rejected.FN15 
 
 By March 5, the PRC had announced that it was going to conduct war games, including 
missile exercises in the Taiwan Straits. The U.S. reaction, given at a White House press 
briefing, was restrained:  
 
MR.  MCCURRY:  We have long felt that military exercises of that nature, specifically these 
types of missile tests, don’t do anything to contribute to peace and stability in the region.FN16 
 
Two days later, the press secretary (1) refrained from admitting that there had been tests and  
(2) that the PRC had announced missile tests, and (3) characterized them in more forceful 
language:  
 
MR.  MCCURRY:  If, indeed, there have been missile tests associated with  military exercises 
that are underway now adjacent to the Taiwan Straits, they would be consistent with what the 
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People's Republic had previously announced. They've previously announced they would likely 
include as part of this exercise missile tests. We would be deeply disturbed by any test of that 
nature, consider that provocative, and consider them reckless.FN17 
 
 The United States was speaking from a position of having monitored the Chinese troop 
movements. It came to the conclusion that the deployment of force in the Taiwan Strait did not 
have the characteristics of a preparation for invasion of Taiwan. Thus there was practically no 
chance that China intended to start a war with Taiwan. Moreover, intentional aggression against 
Taiwan would be irrational from the Chinese perspective (although, with Saddam Hussein’s 
invasion of Kuwait freshly in mind, one should never rule out the capacity of dictatorial leaders 
to commence a wholly irrational war). A war against Taiwan would be irrational, first, because 
several thousand American citizens were present in Taiwan (a number of them working in the 
quasi-diplomatic American Institute in Taiwan set up by the Taiwan Relations Act). Chinese 
aggression against Taiwan would undoubtedly trigger a huge American military response if for 
no other reason than to protect the lives of American citizens on Taiwan. Second, China 
continued to count on the support of many Taiwanese residents who were loyal to the PRC.  An 
invasion that would be [pg89] preceded by artillery and missile fire would not be able to 
distinguish between these compatriots and other Taiwanese citizens, and thus would endanger 
everyone.  In recognition of this problem, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Shen Guofang was 
quoted on Chinese state radio as saying. "China has never promised to give up the use of force, 
though of course this is not directed at the Taiwan compatriots."FN18 How can artillery and 
missile fire spare those compatriots in crowded proximity with other Taiwanese citizens? War 
is simply too blunt an instrument these days compared with the city-states of Machiavelli’s 
time. Bombarding Taiwan would have the effect of immediately turning the compatriots against 
China. Finally, Taiwan had a substantial defense capability. Despite China's overwhelming 
troop strength (over 3 million soldiers), its meager amphibious capability would give Taiwan's 
beach perimeter defense an almost insuperable advantage. 
 
 Yet military hostilities can arise from mistakes and accidents, which is probably one 
reason Secretary McCurry used the words provocative and reckless. In the war of words that  
was going on, the PRC responded within five days that the U.S. policy was "stupid and 
reckless.”FN19 I will now try to show that the fear of error escalating into war was the linchpin 
in the confrontation between the PRC and the United States in March 1996. 
  
 The Chinese war games in the Taiwan Strait began on March 11. More than 150,000 
Chinese troops were involved in the live ammunition exercise, as were a flotilla of ships and at 
least three hundred airplanes.FN20  The United States responded by deploying significant naval 
forces to international waters several hundred miles east and southeast of Taiwan, and not in the 
Taiwan Strait. Included was the USS Independence, a carrier group out of Yokosuka, Japan, 
that included several cruisers, destroyers, frigates, and nuclear attack submarines. A second 
carrier group, the USS Nimitz was sent from the Persian Gulf to international waters southeast 
of Taiwan.F21  The U.S. Navy did not conduct live ammunition war games, but engaged in 





 Rear Admiral James Ellis, commander of the Seventh Fleet Battle Force, told CNN 
news: "What is our purpose here, and it is not to bully or intimidate. We are here to monitor the 
ongoing military exercises. The Chinese themselves have said that's a normal naval function.  
That’s what they do with us, that's what we do with them.”FN22 It is a classic case of creating 
an ambiguity between words and actions. The United States did not need two huge carrier fleets 
to "monitor" the Chinese games; that was [pg90] already being done by reconnaissance 
satellites, and in any event the fleets were too far away to see or hear anything with the games. 
However, the PRC, for its part, understood full well that the United States was downplaying its 
naval presence near Taiwan, and rather than contradicting the U.S. characterization, instead 
chose to downplay it even further. Foreign Minister Qian Qichen was asked by a reporter on 
Beijing television to react to the American plans to move its carrier forces close to Taiwan. The 
minister replied, "It is common for U.S. warships to engage in activities in high seas."FN23 
Earlier, in January 1996, Defense Minister Chiang Chung-ling had downplayed the matter 
perhaps to lowest possible level of discourse. Commenting on a rumor about a planned  
carrier traversal of the Taiwan Strait during the Taiwan elections in March, the minister said 
that he had not heard anything about it: "A minister will not necessarily know every trifling 
matter such as this. He is in charge of major affairs."FN24 
 
 In order to analyze these military and diplomatic posturings fully, they must be seen as 
interacting with rules of customary international law. One of those rules is that because the 
Taiwan is approximately 100 miles wide (and 137 miles long), it is an international waterway. 
Therefore, it is legally open to vessels of all nations. The Chinese military exercises effectively 
cut off that waterway, thus temporarily violating international law. Yet I believe it was part of 
the deliberate Chinese military strategy to violate international law. When any nation uses its 
military forces in violation of international legal norms, the intimidation factor increases. The 
target of the intimidation—namely, the Taiwanese people—would be uncertain whether the 
PRC might proceed to violate other international norms, such as the norm against aggression.  
 
 But this violation of international waters also presented a legal and military challenge to 
the United States. In December 1995 the USS Nimitz had traversed the Taiwan Strait. Would 
the U.S. Navy try it again in March 1996, when China was conducting live ammunition and 
missile tests in those waters? To do so would be to present a frontal challenge to the PRC: 
either back down, or continue the tests with the high probability of hitting the USS 
Independence and setting off a war with the United States. Prior to the tests China had issued a 
warning to international shipping and aviation to stay away from the Taiwan Strait. The PRC 
chose its language carefully on March 17, when it was still doubtful whether the U.S. Navy 
would try to navigate the Taiwan Strait. Prime Minister Li Peng said: "If someone makes a 
show of force in the Taiwan Strait, that not only be a futile [pg91] act, but it will also make the 
situation all the more complicated."FN25 The U.S. response was to play down the situation. A 
“White House official" said in Washington: "Although we don't like the newly announced 
military exercise, we take note of the fact that there is little to no interference with international 
shipping or air travel, that they take place far from Taiwan proper so that there is no direct 
threat, and that the Chinese have been careful in their rhetoric not to issue direct threats."FN26  
In fact, the United States did not try to navigate the Taiwan Strait, and China brought its war 





 Allow me to speculate on the reasons behind the U.S. decision not to send either or both 
of its carrier fleets through the Taiwan Strait. First, though the United States branded the 
Chinese war games as "reckless," it had conducted and undoubtedly will continue to conduct 
similar naval war games of its own, especially in the Persian Gulf and in the Mediterranean (in 
order to intimidate states like Iraq, Iran, and Libya.) Any objection to the Chinese war games 
could come back to haunt the United States the next time it wishes to conduct similar exercises.  
 
 Second, the United States set the precedent for cordoning off a portion of the high seas 
when it conducted its nuclear tests in the South Pacific in 1954. At that time it notified 
international shipping and aviation to stay away from the specified area. However, the 
magnitude of one of the test explosions was underestimated by half, and there was in addition 
an erroneous wind prediction. A Japanese fishing vessel, which apparently lay fourteen miles 
clear of the warning zone, was caught in the radiation;  its twenty-seven-man crew suffered 
serious injuries, one of them dying. The United States paid Japan $2 million for the injuries to 
the crewmen and the damage to the Japanese fishing industry.FN27 Japan explicitly refused to 
demand that the United States discontinue its tests.FN28 
 
 These facts appear to establish that when the international legal norm of freedom of the 
seas is temporarily violated for the purpose of conducting weapons tests, the norm should be 
interpreted as a ‘liability’ rather than a "property" norm.FN29 Under this interpretation, if the 
USS Independence were to have entered the proclaimed war games zone in the Taiwan  
Strait) and if it had been hit by Chinese artillery fire or a missile, China could restored the 
situation to the status quo ante by promptly offering to pay full damages to the United 
However, this legal result would have been extraordinarily difficult for President Clinton to 
explain to the American people. There would have been cries in Congress to [pg92] retaliate 
with full force against China and the president would have been criticized as a weakling for 
accepting payment from China for the affront to the U.S. Navy. Thus, assuming that lawyers for 
the Pentagon and the State Department reasoned the matter through to this point, they might 
very well have advised the president that it was politically a no-win situation to send an carrier 
force through the Taiwan Strait.  
 
 The preceding two reasons have to do with the relation between rules of customary 
international law and military strategy. A third reason bears on the relation between political 
prediction and military strategy. White House political advisers may have come to the 
conclusion that the PRC made a political miscalculation in deciding to conduct military 
exercises in the Taiwan Strait. The PRC may have acted out of a sense of frustration that 
Taiwan was gradually heading toward independence from the mainland; not knowing exactly 
what to do about it, China may have simply decided to flex its military muscles—a decision 
that may have had more to do with the fact that the leadership was aging and nearly senile than 
with any sound political calculation. 
 
 But the predictable consequences of a military show of force in the Taiwan Strait would 
be to drive the Chinese compatriots on Taiwan closer to the rest of the Taiwanese citizenry, for 
reasons I have suggested earlier in this essay. Hence it would not be surprising to see in the 
months that followed an acceleration in the overseas activities of Taiwanese officials in the 
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direction of independent statehood for Taiwan, stimulated by the Chinese demonstration in the 
Taiwan Strait in March 1996 (as, indeed, there has been in the years since 1996). If the White 
House made a similar assessment, then its best strategy would have been to bring the USS 
Nimitz and the Independence into the area—so as to show support for the people on Taiwan—
and at the same time let China go ahead with its war games with only mild remonstrance from 
the White House press secretary. If I am correct about White House strategy, it would simply 
be the latest example of an ambiguous and hence remarkably flexible policy that served the 
United States well through the years in preserving peace in the region of the Taiwan Strait and 
allowing the Two China Problem to work itself out at its own pace. In reading Machiavelli, one 
finds numerous examples of political miscalculation by princes and other rulers. One can be 
impressed by the subtlety and skill of Chinese diplomats and government spokespersons in the 
incident of the Taiwan Strait, and yet come to the conclusion that they may have simply been 
putting the best possible face on a mental decision that was ill-conceived and counter- 
productive.  
 
 [pg93] Nevertheless, Machiavelli would appreciate the uses to which China could put its 
perceived willingness to challenge international law in pursuit of political advantage. To be 
feared by the Taiwanese government could carry more benefits than to be loved even by the 
PRC compatriots in Taiwan. And to induce a certain caution in the actions of the world's 
premier superpower demonstrated leverage that Beijing might find useful in some future 
confrontation. 
 
 Moreover, an act of (even symbolic) force that contravenes international law may—
particularly if it is repeated—create a new state of affairs to which international law eventually 
will accommodate itself. Machiavelli recognized that an "external cause," such as a military 
defeat, may bring about "necessary change” in the laws of a state, a process that he 
distinguished from change brought about "by its own intrinsic good sense.”FN30 International 
law may be even more subject to alteration not through appeals to reason but through the 
creation of  a new status quo by means of power. Machiavelli did not advocate the use of force 
to establish an altered power relationship "for though [external force] be the best remedy [for 
the degeneration of laws] it is so dangerous that in no case is it what one should  desire."FN3l 
Still, when corruption has set in (and China has indicated that certain aspects of  inter-
national1aw, such as the "unequal treaties" imposed on it in the nineteenth century, are tainted 
with injustice or corruption), "normal methods will not suffice ... Hence it is necessary to resort 
to extraordinary methods, such as the use of force and an appeal to arms."FN32 Frequent 
renovations are beneficial if they lead institutions "back to their start"—that is, back to their 
initial uncorrupted state. If removing any international legal barrier to China's ability to act as it 
pleased in the straits between the mainland and its "province" was viewed in Beijing as a 
cleansing of corrupt institutions and if  "men never do good unless necessity drives them to it," 
then China's leaders could have reasoned in a Machiavellian way if they determined to risk the 
hazardous use of force.FN33  
 
 Machiavelli leaves one, then, with both an optimistic and a pessimistic prognostication 
for the post-Cold War world. On the one hand, the end of that conflict has opened the way for 
the spread of liberal, constitutional regimes, which he would say are inclined to be more  
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and more meticulous in honoring their commitments.FN34 On the other, the temptation to use 
force to create new facts and thereby force international law into new paths will remain as long 
as politics is practiced. The contemporary relevance of Machiavelli may be seen in that he 





*Numbers  in the format “pg82” etc. refer to the pagination of the original publication. 
 
FN l. He discussed Rome's violation of the  law of nations in Discourses, II.28.  
 
FN2 For an earlier essay discussing triangular relationships in Machiavelli’s concept of power,  
see Anthony D'Amato, “The Relevance  of Machiavelli to Contemporary World Politics”,  in 
The  Political Calculus: Essays on Machiavelli’s Philosophy, ed. Anthony Parel (Toronto; 
University of  Toronto Press, 1972), p. 209.   
 
FN3 Discourses, I.34 
 
FN4  Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, XII.18: “a leader having his state built on mercenary  
armies will never be secure."  
 
FN 5. Discourses, I.9.  
 
FN6.  Ibid., I.45.  
 
FN7.  Customary international law is derived from the accommodations states work out in  
claim-conflict situations. International law as a whole is an extrapolation from state behavior—
what other states do, and how they react to what other states do. 
 
FN8  Discourses, I.58.  
 
FN9.  Ibid., I.16.  
 
FN10.  The Prince, XIX.190-300. 
  
FN11. Mutual Defense Treaty, December 2, 1954, United States—Republic of China [Taiwan] 
6 U.S.T 433, TIAS No. 3178. 
 
FN12. 93 Stat. 14 (1979), 22 U.S.C.  § 3301.  
 
FN13. Press briefing by Mike McCurry, 1996 WL 60961 (White House, February 13, 1996).  
 




FN15. CNN News Report, 6:03 p.m. ET, March 12, 1996. Later, on March 26, 1996 Foreign 
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